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execution. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), held that insan-
ity will prohibit the carrying out a of death sentence. In a footnote, the
Evans court limited post-conviction review to the circumstance of
insanity. Evans, 916 F.2d 166, n. 1.
The second exception to the Teague new rule doctrine is pro-
cedural in nature, permitting a new rule to be applied retroactively if
it is a "watershed" rule that is essential to the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2822,2831 (1990). Evans
asserted that no procedure exists whereby his first exception claim
might be heard. The nature of his second claim is such that it falls with
the first. The lack of procedure to hear a first exception claim is moot
when the first exception claim is found not to have merit. Nonethe-
less, the second Evans claim brings up an interesting distinction be-
tween reliability and "fundamental fairness."
The court analogizes Evans' second exception claim to several
cases involving new evidence relevant to the conviction or sentencing
of the defendant. Their reasoning does not entirely address Evans'
claim regarding a change in his death qualification after sentencing.
A typical Teague second exception claim would involve the inability
of the accused to present evidence at the guilt or sentencing phase of
a trial, or fundamental procedural impediments affecting reliability.
Evans asserts that the rule regarding accuracy of conviction should
also apply to death qualification, which in the case of a conviction
based solely upon future dangerousness could involve matters after
sentencing.
The "watershed rule" definition of the second Teague exception
is a narrow reading in that "fundamental fairness" seems to exclude
anything but a glaring deprivation of rights during trial. In the name
of finality in judicial decision-making, the Sawyer decision all but
eliminates the second exception as a means of federal habeas relief.
(See case summary of Sawyer v. Smith, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
3, No. 1, p. 4 (1990)). Historically, the purpose of habeas corpus has
been protection of the wrongly accused. Capital punishment based
upon future dangerousness raises the question of whether one may be
"innocent" of the death penalty. Cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
537 (1986).
In closing, the Court of Appeals labeled Evans' claim as a plea
for executive clemency clothed as a petition for habeas relief. The
Evans decision does not further narrow federal habeas review but it
does demonstrate that few avenues of relief are available after sen-
tencing and direct appeal. Although evidence that long term predictions
of future dangerousness are unreliable continues to mount (See
Marquart and Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-commuted
Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23
Loyola L.A.L. Rev. 5 (1989)), practically speaking there is simply no
procedure for assessing claims that a sentencing jury erred in its
finding.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
BASSETTE v. THOMPSON
915 F.2d 932 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Herbert Russell Bassette was convicted of the 1979 murder of a
sixteen-year-old night attendant during the robbery of a gas station in
Richmond. Three participants in the robbery testified that Bassette
shot the victim while he begged for mercy. This case arises from
Bassette's federal habeas corpus petition.
Bassette presented thirty-six grounds for relief to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. That court
found that all but seven of these claims were barred by a Virginia state
rule that prevents the hearing of a claim by a federal court if it has not
been brought previously to a state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth circuit decided that under a new line of cases, all but
three of Bassette's claims for habeas corpus relief are barred.
HOLDING
Bassette asserted many grounds for relief but the holdings of the
U.S. Court of Appeals which merit discussion in this summary are
limited to those which are not bound by the specific facts of the case.
The Court held that the district court read Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.
255 (1989) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) too narrowly, and
should not have heard seven of Bassette's claims. Bassette v.
Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 936 (1990). Harris holds that when it is
contended that an appellant is barred from presenting a claim to the
federal court because of state procedural rules, the federal court may
still elect to consider the federal questions involved unless the state
court has specifically stated it found against appellant based on a
procedural bar. Harris, 489 U.S. at 261. Teague addressed, among
other things, the issue that a claim, when it has never been raised in
state court, is barred from federal consideration when there is no
mention of the claim in the state opinion. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299.
The Fourth Circuit decided that the Harris rule is limited by Teague
because it would be illogical to expect a state court to invoke
specifically a state bar to void a claim it has not heard either in court
or in brief. The court decided that Bassette could have brought his
claims to the state court, and therefore the procedural bar contained in
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) prevents him from bringing his
claims before the federal court in habeas corpus. This statute provides
that a claim shall not be heard "on the basis of any allegation of facts
of which petitioner had knowledge at the time of filing any previous
petition."
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Despite holding that Bassette's claims were barred, the court
went on to issue advisory opinions on several of them. Bassette
claimed that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights prior
to a post conviction interview. During this interview, which was
conducted by parole and probation officers, Bassette maintained his
innocence. The prosecution used these statements to argue that
Bassette was not entitled to mitigation of the death sentence because
his failure to accept responsibility for the murder was evidence of
future dangerousness. Despite the judge's certification that he did not
rely on Bassette's statements from this interview when affirming the
jury's death sentence, Bassette urged Miranda had been violated.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) supports his position by holding
that use of statements by defendants undergoing court ordered ex-
aminations where defendants are not advised of theirMiranda warnings
violates the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. The Court of
Appeals stated that 28 U.S.C. §§ 2245 and 2254 (1988) support the
proposition that ajudge's affidavit is sufficient to create a presumption
of truth that supports a finding of harmless error. Id. at 938. The court
seems to misuse the statutes. 28 U.S.C. §2245 is procedural in nature
and requires that judges certify the facts concerning their findings at
sentencing hearings in order to complete the trial level record. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) is also a procedural statute. It acknowledges the
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presumption of truth in a judge's § 2245 sentencing certification, but
also outlines the grounds upon which the presumption may be rebut-
ted. Neither statute dictates that subjective conclusions regarding the
judge's opinion about the relative weight of evidence during sentenc-
ing hearing certifications are above review in the event of constitu-
tional challenge. The statutes apply to findings of historical fact.
The court also said in dicta that a violation of Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985)(holding due process requires defendant have
access to a psychiatric expert where sanity is at issue) was harmless
error under Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1947). Bassette, 915
F.2d at 939. Bassette contended he needed the expert to refute
psychiatric evidence based on that expert's comments contained in a
presentence report. Williams held that due process of the fourteenth
amendment does not require a defendant have the opportunity to
confront and cross examine witnesses who testify about his prior
criminal activity during the sentencing phase of a capital case.
Although not overruled, Williams does not accurately state the cur-
rent law in capital cases, and the more recent case wherein the court
mentions that Williams is cited with approval (U.S. v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41 (1978)) was not a capital case. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349 (1977), on the other hand, holds that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments require the right to reliable procedures at sentencing
phases of capital trials. This entails the right of the defendant to know
and to have an opportunity to rebut evidence in aggravation of the
crime. Id. at 361-62. Clearly, modem legal principles demand that
a capital defendant has the right to be aware of and rebut evidence
considered as basis for a death sentence.
The court qualified its analysis of Bassette'sAke issue by holding
thatAke was in any event unavailable to him because of the"new rule"
doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague holds that if
a requirement not affecting elements of fundamental justice is placed
on states by the United States Supreme Court after the final disposi-
tion of a defendant's state court case on direct appeal, it is a "new rule"
for that defendant and its implications are not open for use in his case.
Bassette's direct appeal became final before Ake was decided. This is
perhaps useful as an example of how important it is to raise all issues
possible at the state court trial and appellate levels. See Hobart, State
Habeas in Virginia, A Critical Transition, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 3, No. I, p.2 3 (1990). Notwithstanding the protection offered by
the Harris rule, if the record does not speak for itself when the case
enters the federal system, many vital issues may be waived perma-
nently. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in
Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990).
Summary and analysis by:
Peter T. Hansen
CLOZZA v. MURRAY
913 F.2d 1092 (1990)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On January 14, 1983, the Virginia Beach Police arrested Albert
J. Clozza for sexual offenses and the murder of thirteen year old Patty
Bolton. While initially denying that he committed the crimes, Clozza
eventually confessed to all of the crimes except rape, an essential
element of the capital murder charge. Later, in an interview he
initiated, Clozza admitted to raping the victim. Clozza also stated that
he had consumed approximately sixteen beers during the day of the
offense. In response to police interrogation, Clozza suggested that
cruelty may have been his motivation for the physical and sexual
assaults. Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1096 (1990).
The jury convicted Clozza of capital murder, aggravated sexual
battery, sexual penetration with an inanimate object, abduction with
intent to defile, and two counts of forcible sodomy. Based upon a
finding of both statutory aggravating factors, the jury sentenced
Clozza to death for capital murder committed during or after rape. Id.
After exhausting his direct appeals and state habeas claims,
Clozza filed petition for federal habeas relief. Id. at 1096. The District
Court denied relief. Id. at 1092. He appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
assigning two grounds of error. First, Clozza claimed that he had been
denied effective assistance of counsel during the trial and sentencing
phases of the capital murder trial. Id. at 1097. Second, he claimed that
the Virginia capital sentencing procedure was unconstitutional under
the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. Id.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Trial Phase
Clozza's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel revolved
around twb concerns: Clozza claimed that his attorney's statements
prejudiced his case and conceded his guilt, and that his attorney failed
to adequately prepare him for cross examination.
During voir dire, but while outside the presence of any jurors,
Clozza's attorney stated that he did not want to participate in the trial
and did so only because it was his duty and his job. Id. at 1098. He
also stated that "some of the ACLU lawyers" would have to decide if
he had gone to far with his instincts in defending Clozza. Id. In his
opening statements he stated it was difficult getting to like Clozza
enough to defend him adequately. Id. Further, he stated, "[i]f it is my
kid, a lawyer training in law school, it wouldn't make any difference,
I would probably want to kill him." Id. During his direct examination
of Clozza, the attorney asked if he knew that it would take a miracle
such as would have saved the victim to save him. Id. In addition to
these statements, the attorney also made the remark during the trial
that it was "really weird" celebrating Halloween while representing
Clozza. Id. During closing arguments, the attorney said that he did
not want to put his client back on the street, and that if Clozza's suicide
attempt had been successful, it would not have been the greatest
tragedy. Id.
Clozza argued that these statements not only prejudiced his case
but also conceded his guilt, thereby establishing a foundation to
overturn his capital murder conviction due to ineffective assistance of
counsel. His attorney, however, defended the remarks as an integral
part of his trial strategy to build credibility with the jurors.
Additionally, Clozza argued that his attorney was ineffective
because he failed to prepare Clozza for cross examination, allegedly
causing the contradictory intoxication defense. Contrary to his
confession statements, Clozza testified during cross examination that
he was sober while abducting Patty Bolton. On the account of this
testimony, Clozza's attorney had to persuade the jury to believe
Clozza's out of court confession statement regarding his intoxication,
while convincing them to disregard his in court statement that he was
sober. Further, the attorney also had to convince the jury that Clozza's
in court statement, that he didn't know if he raped the victim, was true
and that Clozza's out of court statement that he had raped her should
be disregarded.
